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Governance: Who Controls Matters∗ 
 
Bruno Deffains1 and Dominique Demougin2 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we provide an outlook for further research on the topic of 
governance. We review four different approaches on the theory of the firm and discuss 
implications for governance, namely; nexus of contracts / agency theory, property rights / 
incomplete contracts, adaptation, and nexus of specific investments.  
 
1. Introduction 
During the last three decades, governance issues, in particular corporate governance, have 
become a recurrent theme in the law, economic and organization literature. In the aftermath of 
Enron, Worldcom and other recent scandals, it has also become a widely publicized policy 
issue. The question is all the more important in the increasingly globalized world with an 
enhanced competition between institutional systems and, in particular, between legal orders. 
    The notion of “corporate governance” is proteiform3. Various definitions are available in 
the literature, depending, in particular, on whether the focus is on the shareholder or on the 
stakeholder value. For example, in their well-known survey, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) offer 
a very traditional shareholder perspective when they state that “corporate governance deals 
with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment”. Others find this definition too narrow for an economic analysis of 
governance. For example, in his Presidential Address to the Econometric Society 1998, Tirole 
more broadly defines corporate governance as the “design of institutions that induce or force 
management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders” (Tirole, 2001). Also, according to 
Zingales (1998), governance is simply synonymous with the exercise of authority, direction, 
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and control. This perspective is clearly less restrictive than the one adopted by Shleifer and 
Vishny. The difference refers to the distinction between corporate finance and corporate 
governance. 
    The former approach corresponds to a narrow definition that is “preoccupied with the ways 
in which a corporation’s insiders can credibly commit to return funds to outside investors and 
can thereby attract external financing” (Tirole, 2005). Quite naturally, this idea is connected 
to the classical problem of the separation of ownership and control, as initially described by 
Berle and Means (1932)4. However, for such a corporate finance shareholder approach to be 
fully convincing, it would require contracts with all the other stakeholders (employees, 
customers, suppliers of intermediary inputs etc.) to be sufficiently complete to avoid major 
inefficiencies. The obvious difficulty with such an assumption is that it undermines the very 
justification for the existence of firms, and thus, indirectly for corporate governance. What is 
needed instead is a theory of governance that endogenously emerges from the theory of the 
firm.5 
    In that respect, the main difficulty is, of course, that the existence of the firm is mostly 
taken for granted. As noted by Coase himself in his 1992 Nobel Prize address, “the firm in 
mainstream economic theory has often been described as a black box. And so it is. This is 
very extraordinary given that most resources in a modern economic system are employed 
within firms, with how these resources are used dependent on administrative decisions and 
not directly on the operation of markets. Consequently, the efficiency of the economic system 
depends to a very considerable extent on how these organizations conduct their affairs, 
particularly, of course, the modern corporation” (Coase, 1992). 
 It is a fascinating moment in time to be involved in developing the theory of the firm. The 
public corporate government debate receives all the attention – while at the same time missing 
the most important points in our (theorists’) perspective. Namely, it brings together numerous 
theories that have been advanced over the past two decades, asking why control matters and 
what the decision-making processes are. Moreover, there is a growing public interest to 
understand the respective merits of the European-Stakeholder and the American-Shareholder 
                                                 
4 One can also observe that the legal representation of the firm has been considerably influenced by Berle and 
Means’ view. As noted by Roe: “Corporate law is in fact a standard contract that shareholders and managers can 
vary at will. Behind the mystification of the corporation are contracts among shareholders, managers and 
employees. State corporate law sets up standard form contracts that most shareholders and managers want, so 
that the costs of contracting will be cheap. If the standard terms-describing for example, who votes, when they 
vote and on what they vote, do not suit firm managers and shareholders, they revise them.” (Roe, 1994). 
5 Or to put it in terms of Zingales “… corporate governance raises the age-old question of what a firm is. But this 
question should be central to corporate governance. Before we can discuss how a firm should be governed, we 
need to define what it is” (Zingales, 1998). 
systems. The theoretical discussion developed in this paper wants to contribute to the debate 
going much deeper in the understanding of corporate structures.  
    More precisely, the last decades have been marked by great improvements in the theory of 
the firm. After a slow start to Coase’s (1937) seminal paper on the nature of the firm, we have 
lately witnessed a plethora of theoretical contributions discussing and explaining the boundary 
of the firm and its internal organization.6 Recent articles by Garrouste and Saussier (2005) and 
Gibbons (2005), summarize some of the main currents in that development. Elemental 
arguments for the existence and organization of firms refer to theories based on asymmetric 
information, the existence of transaction costs, the reality of incomplete contracts and 
opportunistic behaviour, the ensuing importance of delegation problems, and the allocation of 
property rights, as well as asset specificity or the ability of “adaptive, sequential decision-
making” (Williamson, 1975). In that context, we are seeking “private ordering”, which entails 
efforts by the immediate parties to a transaction to align incentives and to craft governance 
structures that are better attuned to their exchange needs” (Williamson, 2002). 
    Asymmetric information and the ensuing need to align the parties’ incentives have clearly 
had the strongest influence on the governance literature. The idea that, due to the division of 
ownership and management, governance rules (i) must decide on the allocation of decision 
rights between owner(s) and manager(s), and (ii) create the appropriate incentives where it 
allocates decisional power to management, is central to the discussion. For example, 
following Fama and Jensen (1983), there are four essential decision rights regarding a project; 
initiation, ratification, implementation, and monitoring. The first and the third are presented as 
typical management rights and the two others as the owners’ control rights. The use of these 
control rights requires the implementation of a monitoring scheme, generally proxy variables. 
It also necessitates the design of incentive contracts that take the proxy variables to align the 
interest of managers to those of the owners. This question has been addressed by Fama and 
Jensen and others in a long list of ensuing theoretical and empirical studies under the 
                                                 
6 Coase was the first to note that there are a number of transaction costs to using the market; the cost of 
obtaining a good or service via the market is actually more than just the price of the good. Other costs, including 
search and information costs, bargaining costs, keeping trade secrets, and policing and enforcement costs, 
potentially add to the cost of procuring something via a market. This suggests that firms will arise when they can 
arrange to produce what they need internally and somehow avoid these costs. There is a natural limit to what can 
be produced internally, however. Coase notices “decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function”, including 
increasing overhead costs and increasing propensity for an overwhelmed manager to make mistakes in resource 
allocation. This is a countervailing cost to the use of the firm. Consequently, Coase argues that the size of a firm 
(as measured by how many contractual relations are “internal” to the firm and how many “external”) is a result 
of finding an optimal balance between the competing tendencies of the costs outlined above. In general, making 
the firm larger will initially be advantageous, but the decreasing returns indicated above will prevent the firm 
from growing indefinitely. 
hypothesis of complete contracts and assuming that ex-ante negotiations between parties are 
feasible. As a result, these approaches emphasize the trade-off between monitoring costs and 
rents extracted by the managerial decision maker(s). Aghion and Tirole (1997) introduce an 
additional important aspect in the incentive alignment literature. The delegation of a decision 
right already creates incentives, albeit distorted ones, with the size of the distortion being 
heavily dependent on managerial interests.7 Their analysis makes clear that, in some cases, 
owners might be better off accepting a managerial capture leading to distorted decisions rather 
than attempting to control all the key decisions using monitoring and incentives schemes. In 
this type of framework, optimal governance trades off distorted decisions against monitoring 
costs and rent accruing to management.8 
    In this literature, contracts are assumed to remain complete despite the informational 
asymmetries. In practice, many contracts are incomplete in the sense that they do not fully 
specify the division of surplus in every possible contingency, because either specification of 
all possible states is too costly or outright impossible. This creates an interesting distinction 
between decisions made ex ante (when the parties enter a relationship and irreversible 
investments are undertaken) and those made ex post (when the quasi rents are divided). 
Contractual incompleteness creates room for ex post bargaining. In their well-known papers, 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) introduce an elemental modelling 
approach to incomplete contracts providing the corner stone of the modern property rights 
theory. Contract incompleteness forces parties to renegotiate when eventualities not foreseen 
by the contract occur.9 In such a context, ownership plays an essential role by conveying 
residual control rights, affecting the outcome of negotiation in a systematic way. This, in turn, 
influences ex ante investment decisions and the ensuing total surplus. Maximizing total 
surplus then establishes who should own residual control rights. 
    The property rights logic has many natural intersections with the governance literature 
founded on asymmetric information arguments. To give an example, consider the Aghion and 
Tirole (1997) paper. It assumes that the owner (the principal) can freely allocate decision 
rights to management (the agent). However, in light of the property rights literature, it 
becomes questionable whether this is truly possible, or whether decision rights are bounded 
                                                 
7 See also Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999). 
8 A similar question can be raised regarding the question, how deep decisions should be delegated within a 
hierarchy. See e.g. Crawford and Sobel (1982), Dessein (2002), and Harris and Raviv (2005). 
9 In that literature, the outcome of a negotiation is assumed to follow from the Nash bargaining solution. In that 
respect, it is well known that the Nash bargaining axiomatic can be justified grounded in non-cooperative 
bargaining theory. See Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986). 
 
by the residual control rights induced by ownership. In the case where some decision rights 
are not explicitly alienable, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999) explore the possibility of 
implicit delegation sustained through a reputational equilibrium. Existence of such an 
equilibrium is shown to depend on the interest rate level and changes in the principal’s short 
versus long term profit resulting from breaking trust. 
  Models employed by the principal-agent and the property rights theories usually involve two 
players only. The restriction is generally for simplicity of analysis, but it is not quite 
innocuous. In particular, it seems to us to have biased some of the governance literature in 
favour of the conflict between managers and shareholders. Following the seminal work by 
Hart and Moore (1990), Zingales (1998) proposed a departure from this two-player 
restriction, using a similar intuition to that found in the property rights theory. His model 
allows for an explicit consideration of many stakeholders modelling ex-post renegotiations 
using the Shapley value.10 In that context and in the spirit of Williamson (1985), he concludes 
that a governance system should be defined “as the complex set of constraints that shape the 
ex post bargaining over the quasi rents generated in the course of a relationship”. 
    In our reading, one of the most exciting new developments in the theory of the firm and the 
ensuing role of governance is based on the theory of adaptation, by which we mean the 
capacity of the organization to adjust in an environment where uncertainties are resolved over 
time. Adaptation is an old theme in economics. For example, Hayek (1945) already 
emphasized adaptation as an essential characteristic of markets11, while Barnard (1938) 
discussed its central role for formal organizations.12 One of the first modelling approaches 
goes back to Simon’s (1951) seminal paper concerning the employment relationship. Three 
recent discussion papers by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2004, 2005) and Levin and Rayo 
(2003) adapt Simon's idea to build an alternative theory of the firm. The cornerstone of the 
theory of adaptation is the assumption that decision rights are not only ex ante (as in the 
property rights literature) but also ex post non-contractible. In such a context, the allocation of 
control rights becomes paramount. Robertson (1940) once compared firms to “islands of 
conscious power like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk”. With this “island” 
view, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2005) describe contractual movements of decision rights 
                                                 
10 There is a recent literature providing a non-cooperative foundation of the Shapley value, although they might 
not be as striking as Rubinstein's defense of the Nash bargaining solution. See Gul (1989), Hart and Mas-Colell 
(1996), Evans (1996), Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), and Salas-Fumas (2006). 
11 Hayek clearly saw the relationship to governance. For example, he writes “the necessity of adaptation to 
unforeseen events … leads to the demand that the required adjustment be brought about by deliberate guidance, 
which in practice must mean that authority is to decide who is to be hurt”, Hayek (1973, p. 63). 
12 For a general discussion, see Williamson (2002). 
between firms as “bridges”. This setup allows for the development of a rich theoretical 
framework that permits modelling most of the hybrid governance structures encountered in 
practice, including strategic alliances, partnerships, joint ventures, and more. This perspective 
emphasizes one of the central issues in the design of governance “as an allocation of decision 
rights and payoff rights to the parties”, that is how the incentives could be aligned under such 
a structure. 
    The most-publicized theory of the firm is certainly based on the transaction cost theory. It 
seems, however, to never have been fully formalized, at least in the sense of providing a 
unified account of the costs and benefits of integration. As a result, even though many would 
agree that “corporate governance is concerned with minimizing the transaction costs of 
running firms”13, little formal analysis can be found. We have briefly overviewed a few 
theories of the firm and linked its elemental models to the governance issue. In reality, 
governance structures must take care of all of the above issues and more14. The authors are 
convinced that many important results remain to be discovered by linking and combining the 
different theories of the firm. 
    In the remaining, we discuss, in greater detail, the different approaches introduced above. 
We note two important caveats. First, our article is not intended as a survey, but rather as an 
outlook on future research embedded in the existing literature. In particular, we make no 
attempt to systematically include and discuss the broad governance literature. Instead, we 
selected what we believe provides a natural link between the historical evolution and some of 
today's research questions. Second, we do not provide references for or discuss empirical 
papers.  
 
2. Nexus of Contracts 
A major development was introduced in 1972 by Alchian and Demsetz with the idea of the 
firm as a nexus of contracts. Though the paper predated the now standard principal-agent 
theory, it is best understood in light thereof. For Alchian and Demsetz, it is a “delusion to see 
the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary 
action superior to that available in the conventional market”. Instead, emphasizing the 
defining role of team production within the firm, their analysis focuses on the need of a 
                                                 
13 See Mayer, inaugural lecture at the Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2000. 
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approach of the theory of the firm in terms of human capital protection (Garicano, 2005). 
 
monitor (the manager) in order to align the respective parties’ incentives. In turn, to avoid 
managerial shirking in monitoring, Alchian and Demsetz stress the importance that the 
monitor would be the residual claimant. According to this approach, corporate governance is a 
more complex version of standard contractual governance. It shows that, under certain types 
of relational arrangements, only a reallocation of property rights can overcome economic 
agents' propensity to be opportunistic, and focuses on the consequences of the manipulation of 
incentive systems. 
    The main authors who adopt this definition of the firm are Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
They agree to and further extend Alchian and Demsetz’s objection to Coase’s theory of the 
firm. In particular, they reject the importance of authority, and instead highlight the role of 
contracts as a vehicle for voluntary exchange. Jensen and Meckling agree with the importance 
attached to monitoring, but they believe that Alchian and Demsetz’s emphasis on joint input 
production is too narrow and, therefore, misleading. In their analysis, contractual relations are 
the essence of the firm, not only with creditors but with suppliers, customers, workers etc. 
Jensen and Meckling therefore substitute, for Coase’s notion of the firm, the competing 
conception that the firm was a nexus of contracts and, more particularly, “that most 
organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting 
relationships among individuals...”. 
    According to this conception, the firm is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements. From a 
theoretical point of view, the problem becomes one of identifying the optimal relationships in 
a context of informational asymmetries. In that respect, the major development of the 
principal-agent theory of the 1970s and 1980s to resolve moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems offered great insight. Applied to the problem of the firm, the classic model involves 
an agent who takes a non-contractible action to produce output (for example because the 
action is not verifiable by a court). In order to reduce shirking, the principal, who owns the 
output, contracts to share with the agent by paying a wage contingent on the realization of the 
output, denoted by y. The incentive contract is costly however, because any random factor 
affecting the realization of y makes the agent’s wage payment precarious, leading to the 
classic trade-off between risk and incentives.15 This line of reasoning naturally emphasizes 
and limits the governance issues to the conflict between owners and managers and the 
appropriate allocation of risk.16 
                                                 
15 For some well-known results, see Harris and Raviv (1979), Holmstrom (1979) and Shavel (1979). 
16 Obviously, the literature is aware that there are many other asymmetric information and incentive problems 
within the firm. However, as recently discussed by Mookerjee (2005) the revelation principle that has been 
widely used in that literature implies that centralized mechanisms usually perform as well as decentralized 
For instance, Fama and Jensen (1983) observe that the characteristics of residual claims 
are important both in distinguishing organizations from one another and in explaining the 
survival of organizational forms in specific activities. Their analysis explains the special 
features of the residual claims of different organizational forms as efficient approaches to 
controlling agency problems. Concerning the governance of firms, they theorize that the 
board of directors is the highest internal control mechanism responsible for monitoring the 
actions of top management. They argue that outside directors have incentives to carry out 
their monitoring tasks and not to collude with top managers to expropriate stockholder wealth. 
Therefore, the inclusion of outside directors increases the board's ability to monitor top 
management effectively in agency settings arising from the separation of corporate ownership 
and decision control. 
    Attempts to generalize the standard principal-agent framework to multi-dimensional 
asymmetric information raise additional difficulties however, in particular, the multi-tasking. 
For example, the value of a firm does not only depend on current production, but on other 
variables which are much more difficult to assess. Such variables are the factual quality of 
patents and knowledge within the firm, the "mood" among team members of the organization, 
etc. In other words, performance measures used to align incentives will, in general, not fully 
reflect the principal's interest. In such a context, high-powered incentives may in fact be 
counter-productive, introducing congruence concerns. This issue has early been raised by 
Kerr (1975) in a non-technical paper overlooked by the mainstream literature. In 1991 the 
issue resurfaced in two important papers by Holmstrom and Tirole, and Holmstrom and 
Milgrom. Analytically, their model assumes the existence of a verifiable performance 
measure p which is not perfectly aligned with the principal’s objective y. Now, for the sake of 
argument, suppose incentive schemes are linear, i.e. w = s + bp. As in the classic agency 
model, a large value of b will create strong incentives, but now the agent's incentives are to 
produce a high value of p, not of y. When both objectives are incongruent, the principal is 
forced to offer weak incentives if he wants to control the activity directly. This observation 
helps us to understand why real-life employment contracts often differ from those predicted 
by earlier incentive theories. For example this the case, when the agent must perform several 
equally important tasks, but only some of the tasks generate an (imperfect) observable signal 
(measurable output). In such an environment, the principal should not provide too much 
                                                                                                                                                        
incentive schemes. In other words, the entire organizational problems of owners can be understood as the 
requirement to correctly align the incentives of management, thereby indirectly solving all the other 
informational issues. 
 
incentive to perform the tasks generating the observable signal. If he does, the agent will be 
induced to focus his effort and attention on these tasks and, as a consequence, will forgo the 
other tasks that do not generate any observable signal. To solve this dilemma, Holmstrom and 
Milgrom show that the principal must design a compensation scheme which pays a fixed 
wage to the agent and contains no incentive component. Their model provides an intuition for 
the fact that piece rates are relatively rare in manufacturing and why, when used, they are 
frequently accompanied by careful attention to monitoring of the quality. In addition, the 
model explains why it would be dangerous to provide incentives for good performance on 
individual projects, in a context where individuals are also expected to partake in a team 
effort, assuming the latter is difficult to assess.17 
    There are constellations where the foregoing problem is better resolved by an alternative 
organizational form, based on outsourcing, where the agent, instead of the principal, becomes 
the owner of the productive asset. Intuitively, if the agent owns the asset, he does not only 
receive a wage based on measured performance, but also benefits from the remaining value of 
the asset after production has taken place. In other words, the agent’s effort can be aligned 
using two sources of incentives rather than one. This illustrates that incentive contracts are not 
the only source of incentives. The Holmstrom-Tirole model shows that the allocation of 
control rights may be just as important as contracts in structuring incentives within (and 
between) firms. In conclusion, thinking of governance through the lens of “the firm as a nexus 
of contract”, as initially advocated by Alchian, Demsetz, Fama, Jensen, Meckling and others, 
leads us right back, via the multi-tasking problem, to the importance of “who controls”. 
 
3. Property Rights and Incomplete Contracts     
The current property rights view of the firm was initially developed by Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). In their framework, the firm is defined as a collection of 
physical assets that are jointly owned and as an institution that interacts with other economic 
agents in an environment where contracts are incomplete. In such a context, ownership 
matters because it confers residual control rights, which assign the right to determine how the 
asset is used in circumstances not covered by existing contracts, customs, or the law. This 
definition has the additional merit of differentiating between a simple contractual relationship 
                                                 
17 Lazear (2000) describes the transition from salaries to piece rates at a firm that installs auto windshields. The 
data show convincingly that output increased, due to two predicted effects: Piece rates provided stronger 
incentives for hard work and also induced self-selection toward a workforce that benefited from those incentives. 
 
and a firm. Since the firm is defined by the non-contractual element (the allocation of 
ownership), corporate governance – as opposed to contractual governance – is defined by the 
effect of this non-contractual element. Consequently and not surprisingly, in the past decade 
the corporate governance literature has focused on the allocation of ownership. More 
specifically, some problems like hold-up have been discussed in detail.18 On the other hand, 
this definition has the drawback of making all stakeholders, other than the owner of physical 
assets, unimportant to an understanding of the firm. 
    Grossman, Hart and Moore’s theory of the firm is one of organizational boundaries 
reflecting the trade-offs surrounding the allocation of residual control rights. To review the 
underlying argument of that theory, we follow Hart’s (1995) Clarendon Lectures. It develops 
a simplified version of the main idea in a framework with only two physical assets and two 
agents whereby, independently of the allocation of property rights, the agent must undertake 
an action. For the sake of argument, we will refer to the agent's actions as investment in 
human capital.  
    The timing of the game is as follows. First, the two parties negotiate over the control of the 
respective assets (and, thus, over the residual control rights). There are different possibilities; 
either each party owns one of the assets, or agent 1 or agent 2 owns both assets. Second, the 
parties simultaneously decide on an action ai∈Ai at cost ci(ai). Third, the parties observe both 
the action vector a = (a1, a2) and the state of the world s∈S. Fourth, the parties negotiate over 
which decision d∈D should be implemented and over the size of a transfer payment p from 
party 2 to party 1.19 Fifth, the decision and the transfers resulting from negotiation are 
implemented inducing the respective payoffs, U1 (a,s,d) + p, U2 (a,s,d) - p. 
    The key departure from foregoing models is that ex-ante contracts which would condition 
payments on the parties’ actions (or a proxy) are assumed infeasible. Consequently, the 
actions (a1, a2) and the payoffs (U1, U2) are non-contractible. In contrast, the decision d, which 
was assumed non-contractible in the second stage, is taken to become contractible at the 
negotiation stage –  i.e. after the state of nature has been revealed, but before the decision is 
actually implemented.20 
    The reasoning developed follows from the observation that the allocation of control rights 
in the first stage also establishes the allocation of surplus at the negotiation stage. At this node 
                                                 
18 This explains why some authors claim that the theory of the firm has become too narrowly focused on the 
hold-up problem and the role of asset specificity (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998). 
19 Since p can become negative, this assumption is without loss of generality. 
20 This point was recently emphasized by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2004). 
of the game, property rights play a key role by defining the respective threat point (i.e. the 
parties’ utility if negotiation were to fail). Typically, negotiation between the parties is 
represented through a Nash-bargaining game.21 Rational players will anticipate the outcome 
of the game and invest accordingly in order to maximize their own payoffs. An important 
aspect of the Nash-bargaining is that the parties undertake the efficient decision, conditional 
on the respective investments and the realization of the state of nature, but regardless of which 
party controls the decision. Because investments influence the parties' respective threat points, 
it also affects transfer payments at the negotiation stage. Accordingly, the ai and, thus, the 
overall surplus, are indirectly determined by the initial allocation of control rights. As a result, 
the property rights theory requires that the allocation of property rights (in this context 
governance) should be chosen to maximize the total surplus. 
    The foregoing digression suggests a few immediate conclusions. One example might be if 
the investment decision of one party is insensitive to the fact that parties should not own 
either of the assets. Specifically, suppose that one of the parties only needs to invest in general 
human capital while the other must invest in specific human capital. Clearly the latter, rather 
than the former, should own both assets. 
    Formal writing of the model by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2004) allows further 
conclusions. At the negotiation stage the parties know the action vector a and the state s. The 
(conditionally) efficient decision 
 
),,(),,(maxarg),( 21
* dsaUdsaUsad Dd += ∈  
 
induces payoffs )),(,,(),( ** sadsaUsaU ii = . Suppose party i controls the asset, and, thereby, 
the residual decision right. To calculate the respective threat points at the bargaining stage, 
party i’s decision if negotiation fails is denoted ),( sadi . Thus, ),( sadi  maximizes party i’s 
own utility. That decision induces the threat points ,2,1)),,(,,(),( == jsadsaUsaU ijij  and 
the total surplus ),(),( 21 saUsaU
ii + . In general, we would expect 
                                                 
21 The use of the Nash-bargaining solution is in part problematic. As is well-known, the Nash-bargaining 
approach stems from cooperative game theory. Models that intertwine cooperative and non-cooperative games 
often use Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) to provide a non-cooperative foundation of the Nash-
bargaining solution. The argument is not fully convincing, as in a complete non-cooperative game, the 
bargaining strategies may themselves intertwine with parts of the remaining game. For a discussion of this point 
see Watson (2002). 
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as represented in Figure 1. It is precisely the resulting potential surplus which creates 
incentives for the parties to negotiate at the bargaining stage. 
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Figure 1: Investment Incentives 
    Following Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2004), suppose that the parties agree on the Nash-
bargaining solution, i.e. they choose d and p to solve 
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where p is the negotiated transfer payment from party 2 to party 1 for which the controlling 
party i agrees to undertake decision d. It is easily verified that the first-order condition for p 
yields: 
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from which it follows that the decision d solves: 
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But since the ),( saU ij  are independent of the decision, it follows that whichever party i 
controls the asset, he will implement the decision ),(* sadd = . Altogether, this proves that the 
parties bargain to the efficient decision, conditional upon the observed actions and the 
realized state, regardless of asset ownership. 
    Nevertheless, ownership and, thus, control matters, despite the fact that it does not affect 
decision making at the bargaining stage. To see this, notice that in state s party j’s net 
payment when the other party has control and vector a has been invested is: 
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The first term involves the efficient total surplus, ( )),(),( ** saUsaU kj + , whereas the second 
involves the threat point differential, ( )),(),(* saUsaU ikj − . Using this terminology, party j’s 
investment decision has a half-strength incentive to maximize total surplus. However, it also 
has a half-strength incentive to maximize the difference between threat points. 
    In this framework, it becomes possible to analyze who is the more appropriate party to 
maximize total surplus. Following Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2004), it appears that the 
half-strength incentives to maximize the efficient total surplus are irrelevant. These incentives 
exist regardless of who owns the asset, so optimal asset ownership is determined entirely by 
the threat point terms. 
    In the model, it is interesting to identify a governance structure, such that the existing half-
strength incentives from total surplus closely approximate the missing half-strength 
incentives, in order to maximize the difference between the threat points. How well it is 
possible to succeed in this question depends on the details of the model. The threat point 
terms could create incentives that are too weak, too strong, or just right. Furthermore, in a 
multi-task setting, these incentives could be well-aligned or misdirected with the maximized 
total surplus. 
    Finally, the property rights approach does not allow for any other changes in incentives and 
behaviour of the transacting parties when the relationship is brought from the market inside 
the firm (vertical integration vs. outsourcing). Thus, it neglects differences between market 
transactions and internal organization other than simply a change in relative bargaining power 
between self-interested managers. However, the objective functions possessed by managers 
and the incentive and payoff structure that they face are different for managers within a firm, 
as compared to managers in separate firms. One of the key tasks of management is to develop 
monitoring and financial incentive arrangements within the firm that induce the managers and 
employees to pursue the interests of the firm rather than the interests of a hypothetical 
independent division of the firm producing for its own account (Williamson, 1985, 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990). These incentive arrangements include compensation 
contracts that partially tie compensation to overall firm performance and the effects of 
employee behaviour on promotion opportunities and continued employment. In short, other 
things equal, the incentive and ability of a manager within a firm to exploit specific 
investments of another division is different from what it would be, if the managers were 
managing two independent firms. Monitoring behaviour and the costs and distribution of 
information are also likely to be different within a firm than between independent firms.   
    A recent article by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) exploits the combination of theories 
of the firm based on the property rights and on the incentive contract approach in a repeated 
game environment. Their model allows distinguishing between four possible governance 
forms: spot outsourcing, spot employment, relational outsourcing, and relational employment. 
The paper derives many interesting results. In particular, it provides a nice explanation as to 
why firms cannot mimic the spot market outcome after bringing a transaction inside the 
organization even under a relational equilibrium. Specifically, they prove that the reneging 
temptation is always too great. More importantly, it shows that depending on some of the 
underlying parameters, each governance form may Pareto-dominate the others, and how the 
choice of governance interacts with the incentive contract. For example, their model provides 
a natural explanation as to why incentive contracts are “higher powered” in relational 
outsourcing contracts than in employment contracts. 
 4. Adaptive Organizations 
The perspectives adopted by the preceding approaches are not completely satisfying. They 
asssume that contracting for a decision takes place either ex ante, as in the agency perspective, 
or ex post, as in the property rights approach. However, as noted by Gibbons (2005), 
contracting for a decision may not be feasible at all, and optimal governance may emerge 
from contracting for control instead. In other words, in absence of ex-ante and ex-post 
contracts for a decision, the delegation of decision rights can become the only possible 
alternative. 
    An appealing way to interpret some recurrent provisions in the assignment of decision 
rights is in terms of mechanisms aimed to guarantee the best possible adaptation of the 
parties. This emphasis on adaptation goes back to early contributions by Simon (1951) and 
Williamson (1975). As noted recently by Williamson, the study of governance has focused on 
problems like bounded rationality or opportunism, but “the lesson for the science of contracts 
is different: all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete. For this reason, parties will be 
confronted with the need to adapt to unanticipated disturbances that arises by reason of gaps, 
errors and omissions in the original contract” (Williamson, 2002). It has regained attention in 
organization theory due to recent papers by Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2004, 2005) and 
Levin and Rayo (2003). Meanwhile, empirical works have also flourished, studying 
contractual provisions aimed to offer automatic adaptation mechanisms to govern the 
relationship between independent firms. 
    In the remaining of the section, we briefly review the “contracting for control” argument 
developed by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy. In a line of papers on the subject, they explain 
that “control matters because it will be used, not just ... as a bargaining chip” as in the 
property rights literature. Instead, governance structures are designed to directly induce the 
most efficient behaviour ex post in an environment where contracts cannot. To model the 
idea, the authors extend the idea of adaptation studied by Simon (1951) to capture the design 
of organization and, in particular, the shifting of decision rights across fixed boundaries of 
firms.22 
                                                 
22 However, Simon’s approach (which is cast as a theory of employment, rather than a theory of the firm) is quite 
different because it concerns a situation where contracting is possible ex ante. Two parties choose between (a) 
negotiating a decision before uncertainty is resolved or (b) allocating authority to one party (the “boss”), who 
can then make a self-interested decision after uncertainty is resolved. Simon calls the latter an employment 
contract. Under such a contract, the subordinate faces a trade-off between flexibility and exploitation: She can 
sacrifice flexibility by locking in a decision now, or she can risk exploitation by allowing the boss to decide later. 
    Under the timing of their model parties first negotiate over control of decision rights. For 
the sake of argument, suppose there are only two parties A and B, and one decision right. 
However, the idea easily extends to multiple parties and decision rights. Second, the parties 
observe the state of the world, s, drawn from a set S according to a known distribution p(s). 
Just as in the Grossman, Hart and Moore environment, it is assumed that parties cannot write 
contracts conditioning decisions on the realization of s or a proxy thereof. Next, the party with 
the control right chooses a decision, d, from the set D. In contrast with the Grossman, Hart 
and Moore framework, it is assumed that at this stage of the game the parties cannot 
negotiate. Instead, if party i controls the decision right, then in state s she will choose the 
decision )(sdi  that maximizes her own utility, i.e. in a non-repeated game that maximizes 
),( dsUi . Consequently, depending on which party has control over the decision right, the 
organization will either implement )(sd A  or )(sdB . Finally, the parties receive their 
respective payoffs. 
    Instead of allocating the decision right to one of the players, the parties could also agree ex 
ante on a state-independent decision *d . That decision would obtain from maximizing the 
expected joint surplus, i.e. 
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In this most simple environment, the best governance, which determines whether the parties 
should negotiate and agree on *d , or allocate the decision right to either one of the parties, 
follows from the optimization of the total surplus:23 
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Simon provides plausible conditions (roughly, that the parties' payoffs depend importantly on tailoring the 
decision to the state, and that the parties' preferences regarding such tailoring are not too divergent) under which 
it is optimal for the parties to choose the employment contract. 
23 This is the case in Simon's framework where A is taken to be an employer and B the employee (Simon, 1951). 
The analysis focuses on whether it is more advantageous to give authority to the boss or have the parties locking 
in an unconditional decision. Simon's perspective is completely satisfactory. Indeed, if the parties can negotiate a 
decision ex ante, they presumably can renegotiate a decision ex post. However, allowing ex-post negotiation 
leads to first-best decisions as discussed in the foregoing section. 
In their paper on strategic alliances, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy use and extend the above 
framework to derive an elemental model of hybrid organizations.24 The intuition is as follows. 
There are four assets {A,a,B,b} and initially two firms. At the outset firm A owns {A,a} while 
firm B holds the remaining assets {B,b}. The assets A and B should be interpreted as 
generating the core business of the respective firms, while a and b are assumed profitable only 
if used in a coordinated fashion. Now take from the foregoing model the assumption that 
deciding on a coordinated use of the latter assets is not contractible. It suggests different 
organizational forms. For example, the assets could be sold to a third party –  total divestiture 
– or both assets could be acquired by one of the parties – acquisition – or each party could 
simply decide on asset usage – coopetition etc. Finally, the model can be embedded in a 
repeated game structure allowing for reputational equilibria. Altogether, depending on some 
of the underlying parameters of the model, the framework provides a possible foundation for 
numerous forms of strategic alliances. 
    Note that this approach supposes that decision rights can be extracted (or "alienated") from 
their native assets. In practice, there are different inalienable decision rights, i.e. residual 
rights that remain attached to the asset after all alienable decision have been removed. The 
extracted decision rights can move across boundaries of firms without changing asset 
ownership. Licence agreements or franchising are the most evident examples of alienable 
decision rights. The problem consists in identifying efficient governance structures (i.e. 
“allocation of decision and payoff rights to parties through either contracts or asset 
ownership”). Of course, the situation differs according to the nature of the firm’s 
environment: static or relational. In the second case, the governance structure has to align 
incentives of parties to achieve efficient adaptations as states of the world are realized. From 
this point of view, it becomes clear that relationships between firms, in other words “strategic 
alliances”, significantly improve the performance of a governance structure. Of course, 
repeated interactions and relationships can occur between as well as within firms. 
 
5. Nexus of Specific Investments 
      This approach is founded on a broader definition of the firm as a nexus of specific 
investments, a combination of mutually specialized assets and people. Following Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), Zingales (1998) considers that that the 
residual right of control over an asset always increases the share of surplus captured by its 
                                                 
24 See Williamson (1985, 1996) and Menard (2004) for a thorough discussion of hybrid organizations. 
owner - who has the opportunity to walk away with the asset - but does not necessarily 
increase the marginal incentive to specialize. If, as it is likely, a more specialized asset has 
less value outside the relationship for which it is specialized, then specialization decreases the 
owner's outside opportunity and thus the share of the quasi-rents. Owning a physical asset, 
then, makes an agent more reluctant to specialize it. As a result, the residual right of control is 
best allocated to a group of agents who need to protect their investment against ex post 
expropriation, but who have little control over how much the asset is specialized. 
    In another paper, Zingales (2000) states the implications for the field of corporate 
governance when considering the firm as a nexus of explicit contracts and as a nexus of 
explicit and implicit contracts, respectively. In the simple form of a nexus of explicit 
contracts, the firm cannot be worth more than the sum of the individual contracts that 
compose it. Since the only residual claim is equity, it states shareholders’ supremacy in the 
form of maximizing shareholder value as the single objective. By defining the firm as a nexus 
of explicit and implicit contracts, reputation becomes important. Zingales gives the example 
of a firm with the reputation of rewarding employees on the basis of their contribution to the 
firm. Relying on this reputation, employees will make investments which are different from 
those they would have made in another firm. Assuming that these investments are valuable, 
the firm, thus, is worth more than the sum of its parts. Given that implicit contracts belong to 
the nexus, stakeholders that are usually considered being in the environment of the firm, are 
now becoming an integral part of it. Building on the firm as a nexus of contracts, Zingales 
stresses the importance of human capital by defining a firm as "a nexus of specific 
investments: a combination of mutually specialized assets and people". This definition of the 
firm considers all parties who are mutually specialized, be they suppliers, workers, or 
customers. Although this definition does not match with the legal definition, it represents the 
economic essence of a firm as a network of specific investments that cannot be replicated by 
the market. The sources of these specific investments are all corporate stakeholders. In 
contrast to Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), however, Zingales 
also points out that contracts with stakeholders are usually incomplete, thus, leaving room for 
ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm. 
    In practice, this means that two conditions must be met for a governance system to be 
necessary. First, the relationship must generate some quasi-rents. In the absence of quasi-
rents, the competitive nature of the market will eliminate any scope for bargaining. Second, 
the quasi-rents must not be perfectly allocated ex ante. If they are, there is no scope for 
bargaining either. 
    Yet the bargaining over the ex-post rents, which Zingales defined as the essence of 
governance, is influenced by the existing legal structure. A corporation in principle is just an 
empty legal shell. What makes a corporation valuable are the claims the legal shell has on an 
underlying economic entity, namely the firm. While the legal shell and the economic entity 
often coincide, this is not always the case. For this reason, Zingales defines corporate 
governance as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-
rents generated by a firm. 
    Many problems that fall into the realm of corporate governance can be (and have been) 
profitably analyzed without necessarily appealing to such a broad definition. Nevertheless, all 
the governance mechanisms discussed in the literature can be reinterpreted in light of this 
definition. Allocation of ownership, boards of directors, capital structure, labor market 
competition, managerial incentive schemes, organizational structure, pressure from 
institutional investors, product market competition, takeovers, can all be thought of as 
institutions that affect the process through which quasi-rents are distributed. The contribution 
of this definition is simply to highlight the link between the way quasi-rents are distributed 
and the way they are generated. Only by focusing on this link we can answer fundamental 
questions such as who should control the firm. 
    As postulated in Zingales’ definition of the firm, specific investments are of eminent 
importance for understanding stakeholders' role in the rent generation process of a firm. 
According to Williamson (1975) a firm's assets can be classified into two types: firm- or 
relation-specific assets and general assets. The former group comprises physical or human 
assets that are more valuable in the context of a particular firm than in any other context. 
Since relation-specific assets cannot easily or costlessly be redeployed to another setting, such 
firm-specific investments lock parties into the relationship to some degree. Hence, the parties 
in the relationship are susceptible to ex-post opportunism. This opportunism can take the 
forms of hold-up or moral hazard, both putting the quasi-rents of the trading partners at risk. 
The value of general investments, on the other hand, does not vary across different uses and is 
therefore not subject to ex-post opportunism. 
    Finally, the broad definition of Zingales considering the firm as a nexus of specific 
investments has a considerable advantage. It focuses on a governance system that affects the 
incentives to invest or seek power, thereby altering the marginal payoffs that these actions 
have in ex-post bargaining. Unlike the nexus of contracts approach, this definition explicitly 
recognizes that a firm is a complex structure that cannot be replicated instantaneously. And 
unlike the property rights view, this definition recognizes that all the parties that are mutually 
specialized, workers, suppliers, customers, belong to the firm. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
    In the foregoing sections, we have emphasized the role played by parties in the purposeful 
design of a governance structure guiding transactions between themselves. The approach in 
terms of a nexus of contracts considers that contractual relations are the essence of the firm 
and proposes to study optimal arrangements in a context of informational asymmetries. 
According to this view, incentives contracts focus on the conflict between owners and 
managers. It emphasizes the feature of residual claims emanating from organizational forms. 
More recently, the analysis of multi-tasking problems with incongruent performance measures 
shows that the allocation of control rights may be just as important as contracts in structuring 
incentives within (and between) firms. 
    In contrast, the property rights approach strips the firm of most of its organizational 
features and focuses on how ownership and the ensuing allocation of residual control rights 
affects the outside options of self-interested economic agents engaged in bilateral trade. In an 
environment of incomplete contracts, who controls matters instead of the contractual element. 
From a governance perspective, the theory requires that the allocation of property rights 
should be chosen to maximize the total surplus. Combining the two foregoing theories allows 
a comparison of organisational forms based on the interactions between incentive contracts 
and the allocation of property rights. 
    In section 4, we discussed a more recent approach based on adaptation. The framework 
assumes that contracting for a decision is not possible, even ex post. As a result, control 
matters not just as a bargaining chip as in the property rights literature, but because delegation 
of decision rights becomes the only form of governance. The approach supposes that decision 
rights can be extracted (or “alienated”) from their native assets. The main conclusion is that 
relationships between firms, “strategic alliances” in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy's 
terminology, improve the performance of governance structure. 
    Finally, in the foregoing section we introduced Zingales’ approach considering the firm as 
a nexus of explicit as well as implicit contracts. This characterization does not necessarily 
coincide with the legal definition, but it corresponds to the economic essence of a firm: a 
network of specific investments that cannot be replicated by the market. The central argument 
is that all the stakeholders matter: parties that are mutually specialized, workers, suppliers, 
customers, have to be considered when defining optimal governance structure. 
    Altogether, we concur with the stakeholder value as emphasized by the adaptation theory 
and that of nexus of specific investments. Reality of business is characterized by a great 
diversity of situations. Central elements include the feasibility and timing of contracting, the 
costs associated to monitoring in the case of incentive contracts, the degree of alienability of 
decision rights, the allocation of property rights, the specifity of activities, etc. The search for 
optimal governance structure guiding a transaction between parties or a set thereof consists in 
identifying the combination of these elements that maximize the total surplus of the 
organization. At this stage, many questions remain open. How does an organization succeed 
in gaining power different from standard market transaction? Which variables affect this 
power? In particular, what enhances, or reduces that power? Answering these questions has 
become essential for any further advancement in understanding governance.  
    Finally, we would like to note that the discussion should not be limited to the parties’ 
ability to design intelligent governance structures themselves. In reality, transactions between 
parties are drawn in an institutional, legal, standardized framework of social norms, 
interacting with the parties’ design problem and, in many cases, shaping the different 
solutions. The obvious examples are the enforcement of contract terms which often depend on 
the courts and the underlying legal system. Less obviously, procedural rules concerning the 
burden and the standard of proof, and, more generally, all legal constraints that shape the 
bargaining power of different parties, also impact indirectly on the governance design (e.g. 
Bental and Demougin, 2006 and Deffains and Demougin, 2006). From a theoretical point of 
view, legal and institutional structures represent external control mechanisms in contrast to 
internal mechanisms discussed in this paper. The interaction between the two kinds of 
mechanisms provides a natural outline for future research. The importance of these 
mechanisms has recently been investigated by institutional empirical studies. A notable 
illustration is given by the Law and Finance program initiated by La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) that focuses on the importance of legal origins in the protection of 
investors and in the financial structures of the firms. In this paper we have considered a 
perspective of governance directed by organizations. It is clear that other views have to be 
considered, like a political economy perspective (Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
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